Supreme Court Decisions by Editorial Board, Dicta
Denver Law Review 
Volume 12 Issue 10 Article 8 
July 2021 
Supreme Court Decisions 
Dicta Editorial Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Supreme Court Decisions, 12 Dicta 234 (1934-1935). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
Supreme Court Decisions
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - TEMPORARY DISABILITY - PERMA-
NENT DISABILITY-POWER OF COMMISSION TO REVIEW AWARD
-- Consolidated Coal and Coke Co. vs. Todoroff No. 13721-
Decided June 17, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
A proceeding before the Industrial Commission; claimant pre-
vailed there and the District Court affirmed the order. The employer
and insurer company sued in error.
1. Where it appears that prior to claimant's injury he had been
suffering from varicose veins in the injured leg, but that not until such
injury was he unable to work and that the injury evidently caused an
ulceration made worse by the varicose condition, such showing war-
ranted the extended temporary disability found by the Commission,
and with reference to permanent disability there was sufficient new
evidence on rehearing to justify the Commission's modified findings.
2. The claim that the awards are not supported by the findings is
without merit.-Judgment affirmed.
CONTRACTS--WAGES-WHEN WAGES ARE DUE UNDER CONTRACT
TO PAY WHEN CONVENIENT-The Royal Tiger Mines Co. vs.
Abear--No. 13499-Decided June 17, 1935-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Young.
Mrs. Ahearn, as assignee of her husband, sued the Royal Tiger
Mines Co. for balance of wages earned by him, and had judgment
below.
The mining company being in financial difficulties, its employees,
including Ahearn, made a contract in substance that rather than have
the mine shut down they would continue and work, the company to
pay them 40% of their wages in cash or merchandise, and the remaining
60% to be paid whenever it was convenient for the mining company to
pay it.
1. Under such a contract it is not a contract for an indefinite
postponement for the time of payment but is an agreement to wait a
reasonable time for payment of the balance, and where more than seven
months lapsed after the last services were performed and before suit
was commenced, and; it appears that the company's financial condition
is such that to postpone time of payment further would jeopardize the
chance to collect it out of capital assets, and it further appears that the
work done by the wage earner has contributed to the capital assets of
the company, the Court below was justified in holding that the plaintiff
had waited a reasonable time and that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover under the contract.--Judgment affirmed.
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SCHOOLS--SCHOOL DISTRICT-POWER OF SCHOOL BOARD TO Dis-
MISS TEACHER WITHOUT HEARING-Roe vs. Hanington et al.-
No. 13474-Decided June 17, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Campbell.
Miriam E. Roe had been a teacher in the public schools of the
City and County of Denver continuously for eight years when she
was dismissed by the Board of Education of the School District on the
ground of incompetency without any charges being filed and without
any hearing. The Court below denied application for writ of man-
damus.
1. Under Section 8444, C. L. 1921, a teacher in a school district
having 20,000 or more inhabitants cannot be summarily dismissed un-
less charges in w.riting are filed with the secretary of the board, and the
teacher given, at least, thirty days' notice of the charges, and that the
teacher shall thereafter be entitled to a hearing upon the charges.-
Judgment reversed with directions to sustain the writ of mandamus and
reinstate the teacher.
FIXTURES-ATTACHMENT-OPTION OR CONTRACT OF SALE-Dierks
vs. Fischer-No. 13421-Decided March 25, 1935--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Holland.
1. Contract construed and held to be a mere option and not a
contract of sale.
2. Where removable machinery and equipment is placed on a
mining claim by holder of an option to purchase and option is not exer-
cised, he has a right to remove the same and they do not become fixtures
which are a part of the realty where the option contract did not require
him to place improvements on the real estate and the act of installing
them was purely voluntary on his part.
3. The character of the occupancy is the determining feature
upon the question of the right to remove improvements.--Judgment
affirmed.
TAXATION-COUNTIES-TOWNS-LIABILITY OF COUNTY-PROP-
ERTY FOR SPECIAL IMPROVEMENT ASSESSMENT LEVIED BY TOWN
-Board of County Commissioners of County of Douglas us.
Town of Castle Rock-No. 13478-Decided June 10, 1935-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
The town of Castle Rock brought suit against the Board of
County Commissioners of Douglas County to recover the amount of
special assessment sewer tax which the town had levied upon the prop-
erty of the County upon which the County Court house is situate.
The Court below overruled the general demurrer to the complaint and
entered judgment.
1. A municipality has power to levy special improvement taxes
on County property.--Judgment affirmed.
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EQUITABLE LIEN-FORECLOSURE-ALTERATION OF DEED-RE-
SULTING TRUST-NOTICE-Valey State Bank vs. Dean et al.-
No. 13413-Decided July 1, 1935-Opinior by Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Butler.
The Valley State Bank sued J. B. Dean and Mary Dean, individ-
ually and as administratrix of the estate of Sam M. Dean and her two
children, to foreclose an equitable lien upon land in Baca County, on
the theory that J. B. Dean and Sam Dean were brothers and that they
made an exchange of land whereby the land in question standing in the
name of J. B. Dean was to go to Sam Dean. Sam Dean drew up the
deed and on account of judgments against him inserted his wife, Mary,
as grantee. Sam took the deed and did not record it, but left it with
the plaintiff to secure the payment of indebtedness to the bank. He
partly erased the name of the grantee and authorized the plaintiff in
case of default to complete the erasure and insert its own name and
record the deed. J. B. Dean knew nothing of this erasure. There-
after, J. B. Dean and Mary and Sam made an arrangement to exchange
the Baca County land in question for land in Morton County, Kansas,
and J. B. conveyed the Kansas land to Mary, and as the deed to Mary
for the Baca County land had not been recorded, and J. B. Dean had
continued in possession the parties considered a reconveyance unneces-
sary and the Baca County land was not reconveyed to J. B. Dean.
The plaintiff contends that it has an equitable lien upon the Baca
County land to secure the payment of Sam's promissory note and is
entitled to have a foreclosure thereof. Judgment went against the plain-
tiff below.
1. Where a deed is not only executed but delivered and there are
no executory provisions in it, the rule that any material alteration after
the execution made without the consent of the party sought to be
charged, will render the instrument void, does not apply. Upon deliv-
ery of the deed in question the legal title of the land passed to and vested
in Mary Dean and the alteration of the deed did not divest her of her
legal title or vest the title in J. B. Dean.
2. The entire consideration for the Baca County land was given
by Sam. For his own convenience he had it conveyed to his wife.
Where a husband pays the consideration and causes the conveyance to
be made to his wife there is a presumption that he intended it as a gift
or advancement but such presumption is overcome where evidence that
is strong and convincing shows that a gift or advancement was not
intended, in which case a resulting trust arises in favor of the husband.
The evidence in this case negatives any intent on the part of Sam to make
a gift of the property to his wife. His wife held a bare legal title as
trustee for her husband and the property was subject to levy and sale
under execution against him.
3. It is clear that Sam Dean intended to charge his interest in the
property with his deed to the plaintiff, the bank, and the circumstances
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were such as to raise an equitable lien against the real estate in favor of
the plaintiff.
4. While the equitable lien acquired by the plaintiff was good as
against Sam Dean and his heirs and representatives, it was not good nor
enforcible against 3. B. Dean, because when he exchanged his Morton
County land for the Baca County land he had no knowledge or notice
that the plaintiff had or claimed any lien upon the land, and as he
acquired an interest for a valuable consideration, without notice, he took
his interest free of the claim of the plaintiff.
5. As against his co-defendants, J. B. Dean had a right to com-
pel a reconveyance of the Baca County land and the plaintiff is in no
position to complain of the decree quieting title.--Judgment affirmed.
MECHANICS' LIENS-FORECLOSURE-RIGHT OF REDEMPTION-
Twogood vs. Ocaay--No. 13444-Decided July 1, 1935--Opin-
ion by Mr. Chief Justice Butter.
Cauley owned certain real estate and Moberly, a lienor, sued to
foreclose his lien and Gratke, another lienor, intervened. Personal
judgments were rendered against Cauley in favor of the several lien
claimants, including Gratke, and the property was ordered sold to sat-
isfy the liens, which amounted to over $2,000, and at the sale the
property was sold to Twogood for $825 and the share of the pro-
ceeds received by Gratke paid only a part of his judgment, whereupon
he immediately filed for record a transcript of his judgment and assigned
the judgment to Ocsay, who filed the assignment for record. She gave
statutory notice of her intention to redeem and tendered to the sheriff
the amount necessary to redeem, and thereupon Twogood commenced
suit below against Ocsay and the sheriff to restrain the sheriff from per-
mitting Ocsay to redeem. Decree entered below that the sheriff receive
the tendered redemption money and issue certificate of redemption.
1. Upon foreclosure sale in mechanic's lien cases, there is the
same right of redemption as in the case of sales of real estate on execution.
2. Where the owner fails to redeem within six months after the
sale the lienor may redeem within ten days after the expiration of the
six months' redemption period.
3. It is contended that Ocsay is not entitled to redeem because
her lien is not subsequent to the lien upon which the sale was held.
Such contention is not good because the mechanic's lien of her assignor
was wiped out by the sale, whereupon he was left with an unsatisfied
judgment but no lien and he subsequently acquired a lien by filing the
transcript of his unsatisfied judgment.
4. When the transcript of the judgment was filed the title to the
property was in Cauley as the sheriff's deed had not issued, and at the
time the lien was acquired, by filing the transcript, Cauley not only
238 DICTA
had the record title but the right of redemption, and the filing of the
transcript attached to Cauley's interest in the property as a lien.
5. In this situation Ocsay, to whom Gratke had assigned his
judgment, was the holder of a lien subsequent to the lien upon which
the sale was held and as such she had the right to redeem.--Judgment
affirmed.
INSURANCE-FRATERNAL INSURANCE-POWER OF FRATERNAL As-
SOCIATION TO INCREASE ASSESSMENTS - Woodmen of the
World vs. Lamson-No. 13477-Decided June 24, 1935-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
Lamson brought suit below to recover the difference between in-
creased assessments which he was compelled to pay on his insurance cer-
tificate and the amount of assessments in force at the time he took out his
contract of insurance, on the theory that the fraternal insurance com-
pany was without authority to increase his rate. He recovered below.
1. Where a fraternal benefit association provides in its articles of
incorporation, constitution and by-laws that such association shall have
power to modify and change the constitution, by-laws, rules and regu-
lations at will, and where after issuing a benefit certificate based on a
certain rate, it finds that such rate is insufficient and it is necessary to
increase the rate to prevent financial disaster and protect its further oper-
ations, it has the power to amend its constitution, by-laws, rules or
regulations, increasing such rate to a point to properly take care of its
obligations notwithstanding it has issued a benefit certificate based upon
a fixed rate of assessment.-Judgment reversed.
BILLS AND NOTES-AGENCY-AUTHORITY OF AGENT TO ACCEPT
PAYMENT OTHERWISE THAN IN CASH---Garrison vs. Kansas City
Life Insurance Co.-No. 13711 -Decided June 24, 1935--Opin-
ion by Mr. Chief Justice Butler.
The life insurance company brought suit below on a promissory
note given by Garrison for premium on life insurance policy. The note
was endorsed by the agent and sent in to the insurance company, which
thereafter retained possession of the note. The defendant plead pay-
ment, in that he claimed that two years after he gave the note to Wil-
kerson, the agent, the agent agreed to and did accept potatoes in pay-
ment of the note. The potatoes were thereupon segregated for Wilker-
son and were destroyed by fire.
The insurance company had judgment below.
1. An agent with authority to collect a promissory note has no
authority to accept anything in payment of the note other than money.
2. Where in a suit on a note the defense is payment of the note
by merchandise to an agent, the defendant must show either express or
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implied authority on the part of such agent to accept such settlement.
Otherwise. such settlement is not binding upon the principal.-Judg-
ment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DISEASED CONDITION AGGRAVATED
BY INJURY-APPEAL AND ERROR-CERTIFYING CASE BACK TO
COMMISSION FOR FURTHER FINDINGS-The Industrial Commis-
sion et al. vs. Dorchak-No. 13666-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Young.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Com-
mission made a finding that claimant was injured in an accident arising
out of and in the course of his employment but that paralysis which
followed was due to diseased condition of creeping palsy that claimant
was afflicted with at the time of the injury, and. that the accident was
the result of his then condition, and denied compensation. On appeal
to the District Court such court remanded the case back to the Commis-
sion for specific findings as to whether or not the accident aggravated
the claimant's condition to such extent that he is or is not entitled to
compensation. The employer and insurance carrier sued out writ of
error from this order.
1. The trial court acted within its powers in ordering the cause
back to the Commission for the determination as to whether or not the
injury aggravated a pre-existing diseased condition.
2. The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act was to
impose on the District Court the duty of seeing that all issues involved
in the case are determined by the Industrial Commission and if they are
not remand the case for that purpose.
3. Such order of the District Court remanding the case is an
interlocutory order and is not such a final order as is subject to review
by this court.-Writ of error dismissed with directions.
CORPORATIONS-STOCKHOLDERS STATUTORY LIABILITY ON UNPAID
SUBSCRIPTIONS-Frink us. Carman Distributing Co.-No. 13448
-Decided June 24, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
The Carman Company brought this suit against Frink on his
statutory liability as a holder of unpaid stock of Zott Laundry Co. The
plaintiff recovered below.
1. Where a corporation is organized with both preferred and
common stock and the par value is $100 per share, both for pre-
ferred and common, and a person purchases the preferred stock and pays
par value but is given shares of common stock as a bonus and the cor-
poration becomes defunct and owes creditors, such a stockholder is
liable to creditors for the par value of the common stock.
2. Where such stockholder has paid other creditors of the cor-
poration approximately $5,000 he is entitled to a credit for the amount
so paid as against another creditor seeking to enforce the statutory lia-
bility.-Judgment reversed in part.
240 DICTA
PARTNERSHIP -LIABILITY OF PARTNER SERVED- GARNISHMENT
AGAINST ONE PARTNER-*-Denver National Bank vs. Ben Grimes
-No. 13450-Decided July 8, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Hilliard.
Suit was brought below against Otis and Company, a co-partner-
ship, and the summons was served upon one Sargeant, a co-partner.
Judgment was entered against the co-partnership and after return of
execution unsatisfied the court at a subsequent term entered judgment
against the partner who was served with summons and execution issued
and First National Bank garnisheed. Judgment was entered against the
garnishee. The garnishee seeks to set aside the judgment.
1. Where several persons are associated in business under a com-
mon name the associates may be sued by such common name and sum-
mons served on one or more of the associates, but the judgment binds
only the joint property of the associates and the separate property of the
party served.
2. Where judgment was originally entered only against the part-
nership the court had power to enter judgment against the partner
served with process at a subsequent term. The court had and continued
to have jurisdiction of the partner who had been served and had power
to subsequently enter judgment against him and this would not consti-
tute an amendment to a judgment made after the term.--Judgment
affirmed.
APPEAL AND ERROR-JUDGMENT-CONFLICTING EVIDENCE SUF-
FICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-Simpson vs. Slee-No. 13432-Decided
June 10, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
Action of Slee to recover damages against Simpson for malicious
prosecution of a civil suit. Plaintiff had judgment below.
1. Where evidence is conflicting and there is sufficient evidence
to legally justify the finding of the trial Court, the judgment will not
be set aside.--4udgment affirmed.
DIVORCE--SEPARATE MAINTENANCE-MOTION TO DISMISS WRIT OF
ERROR-Pierce vs. Pierce-No. 13700-Decided June 10, 1935
-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Suit for divorce. Cross-complaint for separate maintenance. De-
fendant had verdict. Motion filed to dismiss writ of error.
1. The one year within which record in error must be filed in
Supreme Court commences to run from actual entry of final decree
below.
2. Sec. 5605, C. L. 1921, providing that party seeking review of
divorce proceedings must within five days give notice of intention to
apply for writ of error is no longer in effect.
3. Tender of Bill of Exceptions was made in apt time.-Motion
to dismiss writ of error denied.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEE OF TERMINAL
COMPANY-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-The Denver Union Ter-
minal Railway Co. vs. Industrial Commission et al.-No. 13724
-Decided June 17, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Claimant was employed by Denver Union Terminal Railway Co.
and was engaged in moving interstate mail from one interstate train to
another by terminal company truck at the Union Depot in Denver,
and by a fall was injured in the course of his employment. He was
awarded compensation by the Industrial Commission, which judgment
was affirmed by the District Court.
1. The handling of United States mail across the country is inter-
state commerce.
2. A terminal company which acts as agent for a number of trunk
railroads in operating a depot and having control of passengers and
of their baggage, is engaged in interstate transportation by this essential
part of the movement. It was the facility and agency relied upon by
interstate railroad companies to complete their engagement, and for
which they could be primarily liable for the acts of its agent.
3. A common carrier does not cease to be such merely because the
services which it renders to the public are performed as agent for
another.
4. An employee of a terminal company engaged in moving inter-
state mail from one interstate terminal to another is excluded from the
provisions of the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act, because
such Act does not apply to common carriers engaged in Interstate com-
merce, nor to their employees.--Judgment reversed.
HIGHWAY-CONDEMNATION-INJUNCTION WHEN INJUNCTION NOT
PROPER REMEDY-Scarland et al. vs. Board of County Commis-
sioners of Jefferson County-No. 13546-Decided June 10, 1935
-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Action in injunction to restrain the relocating of a public high-
way. The original located road was destroyed by a flood in Bear Creek,
and County Commissioners sought by condemnation proceeding to
acquire new right of way which would cause Bear Creek to intervene
between plaintiff's land and new highway, thus cutting plaintiff off
from egress and ingress to new highway. Demurrer to complaint for
injunction sustained below.
1. Injunction will not lie. Plaintiff's remedy was to intervene
in the condemnation proceedings. If damaged, they had a plain, speedy
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